

STATE COMMISSION ON RAILWAY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Ministry of the Interior and Administration

PROVISIONAL REPORT
No PKBWK 02/T1/2024
proceedings relating to a serious railway accident which occurred on
05/10/2023 at 07:00 at Gdynia Główna station. Track 5 turnout 45, km 21,522 lines
the Railway No 202 Gdańsk Główny - Stargard
Manager of PKP Polskie Linie Kolejowe S.A. Railway Line Plant in Gdynia

WARSAW, 11 September 2024

<https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/state-konieczna-research-accident-railway>

Pursuant to Article 28f(3) of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003,
the proceedings conducted by the Commission do not determine guilt or liability;

1. Preliminary remarks

The interim report is prepared on the basis of Art. 5a of the Act of 28 March 2003 on rail transport (i.e. Journal of Laws 2023, item 1786) as stated in the text:

‘If it is not possible to publish the Report on the proceedings within 12 months of the date of the event. The Commission shall publish interim reports on the proceedings at the latest on each subsequent anniversary of the occurrence of the event, until the date of publication of the report on the proceedings.’

2. Brief description of the event

The incident took place at Gdynia Główna station.

Passenger train ROJ 50673 of POLREGIO S.A., Malbork - Gdynia Chylonia, departed from track four, in the direction of track no. 1 to Gdynia Chylonia station. This train was travelling along the established route, on the signal S IOa. *Driving at a speed not exceeding 60 km/h, and then at the highest permitted speed* broadcast on the exit semaphore K4^{2/4m}. At the same time, a shunting ride of the rail bus SA 13 8-004 of POLREGIO S.A departing from the service station was carried out. The train was travelling from track 404 to track 15a after a clear route, the end of which was the shunting disc Tm30 transmitting the Msl signal, *shunting prohibited*. The rail bus omitted that shield transmitting the Msl signal, in front of which it was supposed to stop. He raided turnout No. 64, ripping off the switch, and got in the way of the running train ROJ 50673. The consequence of this was a frontal collision of railway vehicles at turnout 45 lying in the second line 5.

3. Type of event: an accident.

4. Date of event: 05/10/2023 at 07:00.

5. Location of the incident

Gdynia Główna Station, track 5, turnout no. 45, km 21,522 of railway line no. 202 Gdańsk Główny - Stargard. Geographical location 54°3r25.0*N 18°31'21.2"E.

6. Effects of the event

The driver of the ROJ 50673 train was seriously injured, two employees of PLREGIO S.A. were injured and one traveller was examined and observed in the hospital ward. Five people on the day of the incident did not report any injuries, while later they came forward as injured persons who suffered an injury as a result of a train collision.

The unit (ra) and the damaged unit (s) of the railway vehicle EN57-1248 were completely destroyed and derailed. The cab of unit A of the railway vehicle SA138-004 was crushed.

Rail traffic control devices at Gdynia Główna station (three long control sticks of EFA-100 needle position controllers) and overhead contact line (two suspension hangers) were damaged.

7. Causal factor (preliminary)

Omission of the Tm30 shunting disc transmitting the Msl signal *Maneuvering prohibited* by the shunting bus SA138-004 of POLREGIO S.A., which caused it to enter the route and a head-on collision with the ROJ 50673 passenger train of POLREGIO S.A.

8. Stage of the procedure

The procedure is currently in the process of re-examining the facts, material and other losses related to the renovation of railway vehicles, vehicle design analysis affecting the safety of travellers with possible additional material collection, analysis and development of possible recommendations for improving safety.

The report on the proceedings is in the final stage of preparation.

The procedure is at the stage of clarifying the contributing factors and recommendations.

Additional re-analysis of the materials is necessary for the final elaboration of the Research Team's position due to the nature of the event its seriousness and taking into account the complexity of work related to the renewal of vehicles and qualification of damage and the possibility of similar cases at the Infrastructure Managers.

An additional reason for the extension of proceedings is the long waiting time for materials from entities involved in the event, in the investigation and long-term treatment of victims.

The findings of the Research Team may be changed at any stage of this procedure, and this interim report is not subject to comments.

9. Security issues identified

The identified safety problems currently focus on the areas of train traffic organisation and manoeuvres at Gdynia Główna station, the conduct of railway vehicle drivers, the application and implementation of train traffic rules in accordance with the regulations, as well as the design of interlocking and communication equipment.

NATIONAL RAILWAY EXAMINATION COMMISSION

THE PRESIDENT/

Tadeusz Ryś

