



2011

Annual report on
the **safety** of
trains

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the safety of trains
2011

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Summary


2011 has shown contrasting results as far as railway safety is concerned.

The number of victims (killed and seriously injured) has increased significantly which has taken the figures back to the level seen in 2008.

This increase mainly concerns accidents to people who were not authorised to be on railway premises and users of level crossings.

The events involving accidents and incidents connected with the operation and the running of trains on the other hand are in line with the trend of a slight fall observed in the last few years by the EPSF.

The safety indicators of the French railway system fully meet the common safety objectives fixed by the European Union and are at a level which is among the best of the countries of the European Union



Preliminary Section

1. Introduction

The object of the 2011 annual report on the safety of trains is to:

- present the significant elements in terms of railway safety that occurred during 2011 on the French railway system;
- supply the values of the different Community indicators;
- highlight any trends if certain types of incidents need to be monitored;
- specify the measures taken by the EPSF and all the players during this year;
- place these elements in perspective.

The report complies with the obligation put on the EPSF by Article 17 of Decree 2006-1279 of 19 October 2006, as amended; *'Before 30 June of each year, the Infrastructure Manager and the railway undertakings shall send to the EPSF a report on safety for the previous calendar year. From this information the EPSF shall prepare a report on the safety of railway traffic and send this before 30 September to the Ministry responsible for transport, to the Land Transport Accident Investigation Agency and to the European Railway Agency.'*

It also enables information to be supplied to the European Railway Agency - ERA to permit it to prepare a summary of safety performance in the report entitled *'Railway Safety Performance in the European Union'*.

The report is prepared from information received from the Railway Undertakings (RUs) and Infrastructure Managers (IMs) in their respective safety reports as well as that collected by the Departments of the EPSF.

It is addressed to:

- *Ministère de l'Écologie, du Développement durable et de l'Énergie* (MEDDE); [Ministry of the Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy]
- the *Bureau d'enquêtes de transport terrestre* (BEA-TT) [Land Transport Accident Investigation Bureau];
- the European Railway Agency;
- the RUs holding a safety certificate;
- the authorities and businesses which hold a safety approval.

It is made available to the general public on the internet site of the EPSF at the following address: <http://www.securite-ferroviaire.fr/> (espace 'Documentation').

2. The European Scene

2.1 The indicators and the common safety objectives

Community legislation (Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the safety of the Community railways) has set up a Community procedure regarding measures and objectives of the safety levels in the different Member States. This is based on three principles:

- define the common safety indicators (CSIs) that can be calculated in each country on the basis of the observable data. These indicators defined on common bases, must be directly comparable;
- fix in all the countries common safety targets (CSTs) in the form of limiting values not to be

exceeded for certain CSIs, the States must, if necessary, apply all the modifications to their national safety rules to comply with these objectives;

- finally, if the levels of safety in the countries of the Union are very different, guarantee the non-degradation of the safety level reached in each country.

The CSIs

The CSIs are defined by Directive 2009/149/EC of the Commission of 27 November 2009 which has been transposed by the decree of 30 July 2010 applicable during 2011. They contain eight series of indicators regarding accidents, to people injured or killed, to dangerous goods, to suicides, to events that are warning signs of accidents, (precursors), to

the economic impact of accidents, to the equipment of the infrastructure and to the management of safety by RUs and IMs. These indicators are defined by a 'moving average' over several years in order to smooth the effect of individual events.

These indicators are global and are calculated for the whole of the railway network. In this, they do not permit the measuring tools of the safety performance of different operators to be supplied, but only to retrace the overall situation by country or possibly by network.

CSTs

The CSTs are defined by eight indicators relative to accidents alone. In order to guarantee the comparability of the values, the methods of calculating the CSTs have been laid down by the Decision 2009/460/EC of the European Commission of 5 June 2009.

This decision also introduces the principle of national reference values (NRV) for each of the indicators. While the CST is the target to be complied with throughout the European Union, the NRV is calculated by country on a statistical series of previous events; complying with it therefore ensures that each country keeps its level of safety.

In principle, the NRVs should be prepared in a 'transitional' manner and progressively lose their usefulness as, in a process of harmonisation, all countries must, in due course, just apply the CSTs. However, since the NRVs are defined as the statistical averages of the corresponding indicators such as are reported in the country considered, and the CSTs equated to the highest NRV within the Union for the indicator concerned, the CSTs will not have any impact and will be replaced by the NRVs which are, in fact, national safety targets.


The following table gives the eight CSTs and the French NRVs:

Category of risk	Units of measurement
1.1 Passenger	Passengers / passenger train-km
1.2 Passenger	Passengers / passenger-km
2. Staff	Staff / train-km
3.1 Users of level crossings	Users of level crossings / train-km
3.2 Users of level crossings	Users of level crossings / [train-km x No of LC] / track-km]]
4. Others	'Other' persons / train-km
5. Non authorised	Non-authorised persons / train-km
6. Social	Total / train-km

2.2 The level of safety

The diagram below taken from the fifth ERA report on the development of railway safety in the European Union gives the different values of the

NRVs and CSTs corresponding to 'risk to society as a whole'.



Extract from the 'Railway Safety Performance in the European Union 2012' report published by the European Railway Agency

Belgium
Bulgaria
Czeck Republic
Denmark
Germany
Estonia
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Hungary
Holland
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Norway

In fact in 2011, as laid down in Directive 2004/49/EC, the European Railway Agency prepared a recommendation for the setting up of a second series of CSTs and NRVs. This second series is registered as part of the methods of calculation set up by Decision 2009/460/EC. The values are always based on the Eurostat data supplied by the Member States. This second series

of objectives takes into account any corrections to this data and is based on the observations of the period 2004-2009.

Thus, France is one of the countries for which the safety level reached is among the best in the European Union.

3. The railway network and changes in the railway sector in 2011

The EPSF, as the national safety authority carries out its remit of inspection and supervision on the national rail network and lines defined by Decree 2010-1201 of 12 October 2010, that is to say the French part of the international section between Perpignan and Figueras.

3.1 The French rail network

3.1.1. The area for which the EPSF is responsible

In accordance with Community law, the EPSF carries out the functions of national safety authority for the lines of the trans-European network and on the national railway system.

This field is laid down by Decree 2010-1201 of 12 October 2010 which places the French section of the international line Perpignan - Figueras in the network under the responsibility of the EPSF.

On the other hand, certain local lines (such as the railway lines in Corsica and Provence and the RER operated by the RATP) as well as the metros and tramways are subject to the control of the services of the State in the person of the Prefect who relies on the *Service Technique des Remontées Mécaniques et des Transports Guidés* (STRMTG) [Cableways and Guided Transport Technical Service Department].

The EPSF also approves the *Règlement de sécurité de l'exploitation* (RSE) [The safety regulations for the operation of port railways] and operates as an expert in support of the French delegation to the *Conférence intergouvernementale* (CIG) [Intergovernmental Conference on the Channel Tunnel fixed link] but does not carry out any inspection functions for these railways.

3.1.2. The French rail network

Mainly built in the XIXth century, between 1830 and 1850, the *réseau ferré national* (RFN) [the national railway network] was unified by the creation of SNCF which took over the management in 1938.

Since 1997 it has been totally owned by *Réseau ferré de France* (RFF) [French Railway Network]. At the end of 2011 it had a total of some 29 273 km of lines 27 728 km of which were open to commercial traffic that come under the constituent sections published [Translators note: sic] by the RFF.

A feature of this network since 1981 has been the importance of the high speed lines which, with a total length of 2 022 km, form the biggest high speed railway system in Europe.

These lines, which are dedicated to passenger traffic, correspond to the principal flows of traffic in the country:

- Paris - Lyons - Marseilles;
- Paris - Le Mans - Tours;
- Paris - Lille (Brussels - London);
- Paris - Strasbourg (Frankfurt - Stuttgart).

In 2011, the section of the high speed line Rhine-Rhône was put into service.

This high speed network connected to the conventional railway enables a large part of the national territory to be covered and to provide international services, in particular to England and the north of Europe.

The conventional railway is made up of a mixture of lines, for only 31% (about 9 000 km) is classed as heavy traffic (UIC class 1 to 4 and high speed lines), 24% (about 7 000 km) is medium traffic, (UIC class 5 and 6), and 45% (about 13 300 km) is lightly loaded. The network has 300 km of interoperable lines. About half (15 687 km) of the lines of the network are electrified, of which 9 698 km at 25 kV, 5 863 km at 1 500 V and 126 km with a 3rd rail system.

The RFN has a few metre gauge lines which are operated separately from the main network:

- the Blanc Argent [white-silver] line between Salbris and Luçay-le-Mâle;
- the line between Saint Gervais - Vallorcine.

The RFN is subject to the safety and operating regulations of the national rail network published by the order of 26 August 2003.

However, two sections are subject to special regulations:

- the line between Salbris and Luçay-le-Mâle, operated by the Compagnie du Blanc Argent (CBA);
- The lines between Guingamp - Carhaix and Guingamp - Paimpol, operated by CFTA.

Finally, the seven frontier sections are the subject of special arrangements which ensure the continuity of the technical and operating rules with the foreign railways concerned.

The RFF has continued its policy of renewing the existing network. In 2011, EUR 1 182 M was spent on renewing track and the points and crossings, EUR 209 M spent on signalling equipment and EUR 24 M on renewing the communication equipment. In 2011, EUR 183 M was spent on the renewal of civil engineering structures and ground structures. Just for the structures in the ground renewal investment went up from EUR 25.3 M in 2007 to EUR 43.5 M in 2011.

The RFF has renewed more than 1 000 km of lines. As in 2010, the renovation carried out on the regional lines remains very much above the target in the performance contract, due to the increase in importance of the rail plans, results of the re-launch plan, and contracts between the State and Regions. The effort to catch up the delay in renewals has still not resulted in an improvement in the overall quality of the geometry of the main lines. EUR 1 957 m was spent in 2011 on the maintenance of the network.

The RFF publishes a Network Reference Document, with an exhaustive description of the technical characteristics of the network annually, which also explains the procedure for application and allocation of the paths and the tariffs. This document is available on its internet site www.rff.fr.

3.2 Changes in the sector

3.2.1. Access to the network

At the end of 2011, 22 RUs held a safety certificate and were authorised to carry out rail transport on the RFN.

Besides SNCF which launched its commercial service prior to obtaining a safety certificate, the

3.1.3. The international section Perpignan - Figueras

Contracted out in 2004 to the TP Ferro company by the Spanish and French governments, the international section Perpignan - Figueras is an electrified line in the network about 45 km long connected to the national railways of each country.

The principal characteristics of this network are as follows:

- two single lines for the connections with the conventional French network at Soler;
- a double track section of 17.26 km in the open air which extends from the origin of the concession at Le Soler up to the entry of the tunnel of Perthus;
- a bi-tube cross-frontier tunnel (Perthus Tunnel) that includes 8.3 km of which 7.4 km is in French territory.

It has been in service with provisional characteristics since 2010. It is subject to special safety regulations for the operation of railways, approved at the start by the contractors.

TP Ferro publishes its Network Reference Document annually. The objective of this is to offer general information on the railway infrastructure of TP Ferro to companies that want to access this infrastructure. This document is available on its internet site www.tpferro.com

table below shows the years in which the 18 companies concerned launched their commercial service. It can be seen that the start of commercial services which accelerated in 2010, saw a volume of traffic in 2011 which was as big. The characteristics of each of the undertakings with their administrative addresses as well as the elements of volume regarding their respective organisations and their traffic are given in Annex B.

The year of launching the commercial service of the RUs possessing a safety certificate that had a safety certificate that was valid at the end of 2011 on the RFN

Avant 2005	SNCF
2005	Europorte France*
2006	ECR**
2007	SNCB
	VFLI
2007	Colas Rail***
	Europorte Channel****
2008	CFL Cargo
2009	TSO
2010	TPCF
	CFR
	Eurostar Int. Ltd
2011	OSR France
	Renfe
	Trenitalia
	Crossrail Benelux
	SNCB Logistics
	ETF Services
	Trenitalia Veolia Transdev

* in the name of CFTA Cargo
 **in the name of EWSI
 ***in the name of Seco Rail
 ****in the name of Europorte 2

3.2.2. The traffic


As far as the level of traffic was concerned the number of million train-km in 2011 was 2.7% up on the previous year. This increase which is the first increase in traffic since 2008 is shown in the diagram below.

Passenger traffic expressed in billion passenger-km is up by 0.12% (82.75) with respect to 2010. This slight increase which is the first increase in traffic since 2008 is shown in the diagram below.

Traffic in millions of train-km



Passenger traffic in billions of passenger-km





The EPSF, the national safety authority


1. Missions

The EPSF has three principal objectives:

- the preparation, for the account of the Minister of Transport, of the regulations which are prepared at Community level by participation in the working groups of the European Railway Agency or at national level;
- the granting of authorisations for vehicles, elements of infrastructure or new lines as well as the safety certification of RUs or IMs. The EPSF also approves the training organisations and the qualified organisations set out by the regulations;
- the supervision, by inspectors or audits, of the different operators and entities that it approves or authorises.

The EPSF also delivers, with the help of the national printing works, the holder of the monopoly for printing personal administrative titles, the licences for railway drivers living in France.

The EPSF registers railway vehicles held in France and holds the *Registre National des Véhicules* (RNV) [national register of vehicles] which contained 122 875 vehicles registered on 31 December 2011.



Distribution of the vehicles registered at the end of 2011 in the RNV by type

Since 1 May 2012 the organisation of the EPSF has been structured to form three technical departments: Reference documents, Authorisations and Checks, which are focussed on these principal missions.

The organisation is located at Amiens (Somme). On 31 December 2011, it had a staff of 96, employed under private law conditions. The organisational chart as at 1 May 2012 is given in Annex A.1.

2. Relations between the EPSF and its principal partners

The EPSF, in its capacity of national safety authority deals with all the organisations in the French railway sector. This is particularly true in dealing with applications from the entities which apply for authorisations, checking that they are observed and approaching them when writing the national regulations. Beyond these 'national' tasks, the EPSF participates actively in the various activities of the European Railway Agency and maintains good relations with the other national safety authorities.

Finally, the EPSF maintains close relations with the entities listed below (Annex A.2):

- the *Direction générale des infrastructures, des transports et de la mer - Direction des services de transport (DST) du Ministère de l'écologie, du développement durable et de l'énergie* [the Directorate General for Infrastructures, Transport and the Sea - Directorate of Transport Services (DST) of the Ministry of Ecology,

Sustainable Development, and Energy] which supervises the EPSF and prepares the French regulations;

- the Land Transport Accident Investigation Bureau. The EPSF monitors the implementation of the recommendations put forward in the reports of the BEA-TT;
- the *Mission du Transport des Matières Dangereuses (MMD)* [Carriage of Dangerous Goods Task Force (CDG)];
- the *Direction de la défense et de la sécurité civile* (DDSC) [Directorate for Civil Defence] which is consulted as required by the EPSF during the examination of files for authorisation for the introduction into commercial service of new systems or infrastructures regarding the problems of emergency evacuation and rescue.



Railway safety in 2011

The EPSF monitors the level of safety by analysing and classifying the events of which it is aware from the sources of information of the Infrastructure Manager (IM), the Delegated Infrastructure Manager (DIM) and the RUs. About 10 000 events were recorded under this heading in 2011. This volume is slightly higher than the previous year, which is due to a more exhaustive study of the sources of information which were widened in 2009. On the other hand, the events classed as 'safety' (events which were or might have been detrimental) have declined, in particular there were 175 'safety' events on average per month in 2011 compared with 188 in 2010. This Chapter sets out to describe the important facts regarding railway safety that took place in 2011.

1. Important facts

Several railway accidents that occurred in 2011 resulted in the opening of a technical investigation carried out by the BEA-TT. The sole purpose of these investigations is to prevent future accidents, by determining the circumstances and the causes of the event analysed and by preparing the appropriate safety recommendations without necessarily determining who was responsible for the accident.

Derailment of a freight train at Artenay (45)

On 9 March 2011, train ECR 62858, formed of 20 wagons carrying mineral water, was running at a speed of 100 km/h on track 2 bis (external main line). Shortly before the station of Artenay and after having seen a depression in the main brake pipe the driver found on examining his train that the 17th and 19th wagons had derailed and that the 18th and 20th wagons had suffered damage. He also saw that there was serious damage to the track and signalling installations over about 500 m. The initial conclusions suggested a fracture of a wheel on the 17th wagon of which one wheel and half the axle were found in the middle of line 2 bis.

In view of these facts, the EPSF decided on 10 March 2003, as a protective measure, to immediately suspend the authorisation of the wagon that derailed (Type Laaips) to run in commercial service as well as all the wagons of the same type of which NACCO is the holder.

Since this date, information has reached the EPSF which suggests that the fracture of the axle of a wheelset was probably due to a crack that started

due to the presence of grooves in the centre of this axle.

The EPSF has asked RUs that hold a safety certificate applicable to the RFN to give, as far as possible, special attention during the examinations and inspections that they carry out on wagons to the presence of grooves on the axles of wheelsets. Any wagon in which one of its wheelsets has marks of this type should immediately be taken out of service for further examination in a workshop. As it is likely that the grooves in the axle of the wheelset fractured at Artenay would have been detected in a workshop, the EPSF has asked all the wagon holders that it knows to remind the entities in charge of maintenance that they have nominated, of the necessity of correctly applying the maintenance schedules provided. It is also necessary to ensure by inspection that the maintenance services are properly carried out and the schedules observed, in particular for the maintenance of the units that are critical for safety.

The report of the BEA-TT, published in July 2012, has resulted in three recommendations addressed to NACCO and to the Swedish safety authority.

Collision of a TER at a level crossing at Saint-Médard-sur-Ille (35)

On 12 October 2011, at about 17.16 pm, a road tractor and trailer running on a county road was hit by a TER working the Rennes - Saint-Malo service on level crossing No 11 situated in the village of Saint-Médard-sur-Ille. This accident caused the

deaths of three people and injuries to 45 others, 13 of whom were seriously affected. The victims were all passengers in the train, with the exception of the driver of the road vehicle who was slightly injured.

In view of the facts that were revealed in the investigation the BEA-TT has issued two recommendations in its report published in May 2012 inviting:

- The RFF to introduce in due course within the shortest timescales, the safety measures for the level crossing No 11 announced in November 2011.
- The Directorate General of the Infrastructures, Transport and the Sea to carry out an evaluation of the conditions for the introduction of the policy of improvement of the safety of level crossings classed as 'worrying'.

Moreover it has drawn the attention of the trainers of professional road vehicle drivers and the public authorities to the necessity of making road users aware of the short time cycle for the operation of level crossings and to the possibility of breaking the barriers if they find themselves blocked in on railway property.

Derailment of a freight train at Valence d'Agen (82)

On 20 October 2011 the Infrarail train 815761 composed of 25 loaded wagons and a machine on a vehicle was travelling on the section between Hourcade and Toulouse St-Jorry. At about 17.30 pm three wagons of this train derailed, two of which finished up fouling the adjacent line. The driver had felt his train slow down to about 80 km/h and had initiated an emergency brake application on receiving a radio alert sent by passing TGV 8568. This TGV, made up of two trainsets, had been hit by flying ballast when passing train 815761. The windscreen of the driving cab had been shattered by these projections. The trailing power car of the rear set of the TGV had traces of rubbing certainly caused by the passing wagons. Fifty windows were also damaged. The causes of this derailment will be determined in the report by the BEA-TT.

The following accidents and incidents, although not the subject of an investigation by the BEA-TT, are significant accidents. These events were the subject of a request for a report by the EPSF as laid down in Article 16 of the amended decree 2006-1279.

Deformation of the track in Solliès-Bridge Station (83) and on the South East high speed line

On 3 July 2011, the driver of the TGV 6876 running on line 2 near Solliès-Pont station felt an abnormal impact following a deformation of the track that required the train to proceed at walking pace. On 12 July, running on line 2 of the LN5 had been prohibited following the deformation of the line at the head of the points of Roquemaure Junction. More than a dozen TGVs had passed over this deformation at normal speed.

These two incidents were discussed during the quarterly meeting to share experience regarding the management of the infrastructure of the national rail network in October 2011. The report was focussed initially on how the facts unfolded. It was then followed by an analysis and a presentation of the action plans in order to avoid this happening again, particularly during very hot periods.

An SNCF worker struck by a train during measurement operations in Colmar station (88)

On 18 August 2011 a member of the Infrastructure Department's staff was struck by a train while he was carrying out measurement operations as part of a check for the setting up of a temporary speed restriction. These operations required him to work in the dangerous zone. The main cause of the accident was the non-observance by the persons involved of the safety rules to be applied during any work on, or close, to the lines.

Disturbance affecting safety in Compiègne station (60)

On 30 September 2011, when approaching Compiègne station, the driver of SNCF train W 708218, having recognised the warning at the previous signal, passed signal C22 at a speed of 25 km/h that gave the indication 'track clear'. Then seeing a train standing at platform II he made an emergency brake application and came to rest 250 metres in front of the back of the train in the platform thus avoiding a collision. During the investigation, the relay in the cabin of C22 was found 'upside down' hanging by its cables. At the time the supply should have been cut off by the zone occupied at the platform, the relay was not able to break the contacts, leading to C22 wrongly being kept at track

free. The relay in question was placed in this position due to a shock on the cabin of C22 which was completely lifted. This violent impact was caused in all probability by a rail-road vehicle carrying out some work on the track (handling of the rails), close by.

The action of the feedback of experience carried out on this incident consisted mainly of reminding all the staff concerned - staff of the IM or sub-contractors - of the obligation to declare an impact with the safety installations, even if it was slight.

One train catching up and colliding with another followed by a derailment between Salon and Miramas (13)

On 25 October 2011, an event was caused by one train catching up with another between Salon and Miramas (13) resulting in a collision followed by derailment of the last wagon of the train in front. This wagon was an empty tank wagon (danger code 33). The collision occurred at about 20 km/h and was the result of the lack of attention by the driver of the train formed of two locomotives running in an occupied block under the 'proceed on sight system'. There were no injuries but the 'Dangerous Goods Plan' was triggered. This situation brings home again the importance of complying with the fundamentals of safety in the basic professional acts in everyday life, whether this is the application of the procedures imposed by the signalling or by the operating instructions for the operators on the ground as, for example, the checking of the route before starting the movement. This situation can be

used in terms of feedback of experience in the field of safety management of the teams of drivers. The management of safety by the introduction of checks on the spot or after the event and the feedback of experience remains an indispensable lever for improving the level of safety.

Loss of the central hinge pin of a two part car carrying wagon articulated on three wheelsets in Lyon-Guillotière Station (69)

On 13 December 2011, SNCF train 58832 made up of two locomotives (one of which was running idle) and 31 wagons was running at a speed of 20 km/h. The driver noticed a depression in the main brake pipe and went to inspect his train. He found that the 17th wagon, an empty car carrying wagon GEFCO with three axles and two articulated parts had split in two at the central wheelset. The first part of the wagon was attached to the 16th wagon. The rear part rested on the track and was attached to the 18th wagon. He saw that the pin which connected the two parts of the articulated wagon was missing.

The EPSF sent out an alert to the RUs, as well as to the holders and entities in charge of the maintenance of which it is aware, requesting that special attention should be given during the examinations and inspections that they carry out on these wagons to any defect in the central articulation. Any wagon that is suspect must be immediately withdrawn from service for additional examination in workshops.

2. Measures taken to help safety

2.1 The EPSF

In 2011 the EPSF:

- organised four feedback meetings during which all the RUs and IMs authorised by the EPSF shared their experience arising from the trends observed by the EPSF and the incidents of which the description, the analysis and the resulting action plans were presented by the railway operators;
- organised of four quarterly meetings EPSF / DST / RFF / *Direction de Chemins de Fer* [Railway Board] / SNCF DIM during which the progress with the level of safety and performance of the management of the infrastructure of the RFF was analysed;

- published a monthly information bulletin on the most significant incidents which was sent to all the undertakings and IMs;
- published a guide for the registration of railway vehicles - the EPSF National Vehicle Register;
- participated in numerous working groups both national and European.

2.2 The operators

2.2.1. The infrastructure of the RFF network

In 2011, the RFF continued the management of safety actions initiated in the preceding years: definition of the safety objectives and monitoring of their introduction, continuation of the action plan entitled 'Objective responsibility for safety' in order to clarify and take up its responsibilities in safety

matters, continued the safety management both at the undertakings and at the extensive IM. The management of safety was also continued within the departments of the IM entrusted with the maintenance of the network as well as within the Railway Board.

The prevention of accidents to people, has led to actions by the RFF:

- at level crossings;
- at crossings of the line at stations.

Four worrying level crossings have been abolished in 2011, which means a total of 22 level crossings have been abolished over the period 2008- 2011. Ninety six projects to abolish level crossings that give cause for concern were in progress at the end of 2011 which brings the percentage of such level crossings dealt with or in the course of being dealt with to 82%. In addition, some actions to upgrade certain level crossings so that they meet standards and improve safety have been carried out. These actions enable railway installations to be adapted to cater for the increase from one year to another of road or rail traffic. As the national authority for level crossings, the RFF in partnership with the State (*Direction générale des infrastructures, des transports et de la mer* DGITM, [Directorate General for Infrastructures, Transport and the Sea] *Direction de la Sécurité et de la Circulation Routières* DSCR [Directorate for Safety and Road Traffic]), SNCF DIM and the District Councils are continuing their programme of experimenting with equipment designed to improve the safety of level crossings. Finally, the RFF organised the fourth annual prevention day for level crossings on 9 June 2011. This event, in line with the second world day for the prevention of accidents on level crossings, had as the subject the attitude to risks.

The RFF decided to take further steps to improve the safety of the stopping points where passengers have no other option than to cross the tracks on the level. In 2011 eight structures to enable passengers to cross the line by a bridge or a tunnel and nine

stopping points have been fitted with pictograms or simple constructions. An action plan called 'Pedestrian Crossing Point (PCP) action plan' was signed on 25 January 2011 and came into force on 1 March 2011. The action involved among other things:

- the feedback of experience on the accident record of the 940 stopping points fitted with PCPs on 31 December 2011;
- a critical analysis of the accidents and their circumstances in order to understand, in particular, the type of persons and the factors that might have influenced the appearance of these events;
- a comparison with the policy carried out by other European IMs;
- the communication and the prevention focussed on the populations at risk with an initial campaign entitled 'Open your eyes' to make people aware was carried out in December 2011 in cooperation with the Railway Board and the Stations and Connections group.

2.2.2. TP Ferro

In 2011, TP Ferro which obtained its safety approval issued by the EPSF on the international section Perpignan - Figueras on 18 December 2010, continued its work of preparing documents for the management of safety in particular the operating instructions and reference documents.

2.2.3. The RUs

The 22 RUs authorised to run in 2011 on the national rail network or on other railway networks which have comparable operating characteristics that are listed by the decree 2010-1201 of 12 October 2010 have taken initiatives to improve safety as part of their safety management systems. These initiatives resulted in investments in rolling stock, actions to make people aware of the feedback of experience regarding incidents or accidents, a monitoring system for the tasks of the safety operators and the monitoring of their safety action plans.

3. Detailed figures

The numerical data given are in line with the CSIs. In accordance with the methods of calculation, the indicators of accidents given in this paragraph only concern the significant accidents.

If necessary, corrections have been made in order to take into account the new facts or the inaccuracies of classification found after the publication of the 2010 report.

3.1 Killed and seriously injured

The table below gives in the diagrams in Annex C the number of people 'killed' or 'seriously injured' during a railway accident according to the categories laid down by the CSIs.

	Killed					Seriously injured			
	2008	2009	2010	2011		2008	2009	2010	2011
Passengers	10	7	1	7	13	14	7	14	
Staff	2	1	1	2	4	3	4	5	
Users of level crossings	38	36	27	29	14	22	17	9	
Non authorised	43	31	37	50	6	21	16	23	
Others	0	1	0	0	2	1	2	2	
Total	93	76	68	88	39	61	46	53	

Diagram showing the number of people killed and seriously injured from 2008 to 2011

In 2011, the number of people killed and seriously injured on the national rail network went up to 141, compared with 114 in 2010 and 137 in 2009. Among the killed and seriously injured it is necessary to distinguish the categories of people involved, i.e. passengers, staff, users of level crossings and non-authorised people. This last category which is the one that has increased the most, has gone from 53 killed and seriously injured in 2010 to 73 in 2011.

The category of passengers has also increased markedly, compared with the very low figures in 2010. In fact we can count 7 killed and 14 seriously injured in 2011, compared with 1 and 7 respectively in 2010. The figures for 2011 have gone back to the values in 2009 and 2008.


The number of people seriously injured or killed is basically due to accidents on level crossings or accidents caused by moving rolling stock. People coming into railway premises without being authorised and bad driving by road drivers are two major weaknesses of the railway system. In particular, the collision between a road tractor and trailer and a TER on 12 October at Saint-Médard-sur-Ille which resulted in the death of three passengers and caused injuries to numerous passengers should be mentioned. The cause of this accident was an inappropriate reaction by the driver of the road tractor and semi-trailer.

But the absence of taking danger into account or its poor perception by the passengers is also a cause

of accident (alighting from a moving train or attempting to board a moving train). In order to reduce the risk of passengers falling from a train, some actions have been initiated during the last few years and are being continued with the object of reducing the number of coaches that come to a stand beyond the platform either by optimising the allocation of rolling stock or by lengthening the platforms.

Accidents to staff that result in death or serious injuries have increased slightly. Two fatal accidents occurred in 2011 due to staff being struck by a train while they were working on the ground. Electrification is the major cause of accidents with serious injuries.


The values of the CSIs (in moving weighted average) are given below.



MBGP = Weighted number of deaths, serious injuries
 T = Deaths and
 BG = Serious injuries per million train-km


3.2 Overview

Relative number of accidents per million train-km



The relative number of significant accidents in 2011 is 0.31 accidents per million train-kilometres. This figure has been falling continuously since 2009. The diagram N10 in Annex C corresponding to this indicator shows the slightly increasing trend because the average values over 5 years have stabilised around the value of 0.3 significant accidents per million train-km.

Relative number of deaths and serious injuries per million train-km




Bearing in mind that the number of deaths and serious injuries is increasing, the relative number of deaths and serious injuries per million train-km is increasing relative to the figures of 2009 and 2010. The trend obtained by a movable average over five years and visible in Annex C - diagrams TS10 and TK10 has been falling since 2006.

Tués = Killed

Blessés graves = Seriously injured


Relative number of precursors (warning signs of accidents) per million train-km



The relative number of precursors per million train-km has fallen significantly compared with 2010. The figure for 2011 is nevertheless above those for 2007 and 2009. The details of the analysis of each indicator of precursors is given in paragraph 3.4 below.

3.3 Accidents broken down by type


Relative number of collisions per million train-km



The total number of significant accidents per million train-km in 2011 for accidents of the type 'collisions' and 'derailments' has fallen compared with 2010. Comparison with the figures for 2007 is difficult in view of the change of scope for counting these indicators.

The fall is particularly large for collisions with 0.024 collisions per million train-km in 2011 compared with 0.031 in 2010.


Relative number of derailments per million train-km



Regarding the relative number of derailments, the decrease is less pronounced. 11 events have been recorded against 14 in 2010 and 2009.


It should be noted that in the two diagrams the value for the year 2007 is not comparable with that for the other years. In fact a modification was made to the scope of these indicators for collisions and derailments including, in particular, the events on service lines in 2008.

Relative number of accidents on level crossings per million train-km




The relative number of accidents on level crossings per million train-km has increased slightly compared with 2010. In absolute terms the increase remains small from 36 in 2010 to 40 in 2011.

Relative number of accidents to people per million train-km




The relative number of accidents to people per million train-kilometres increased significantly in 2010 going from 0.137 in 2010 to 0.152 in 2011. This increase has continued since 2008, taking the number of accidents of this type to 76 in 2011, or almost half of the total significant accidents.

Relative number of fires on rolling stock per million train-km



The relative number of fires on rolling stock has again reduced appreciably in 2011 (0.004). This figure is comparable with those in 2007 and 2008. In absolute terms this indicator only involves 2 events compared with 16 events recorded in 2009.


Relative number of other accidents per million train-km



The relative number of 'other' accidents per million train-km is less (0.026) than that in 2010 (0.041). 13 significant accidents are involved in this indicator among which the majority of events concern accidents to trains while shunting or when participating in work on the track.


3.4 Accident precursors

Relative number of broken rails per million train-km




The relative number of broken rails has fallen sharply in 2011 (0.548) compared with 2010 (0.775). The severe meteorological conditions at the start and end of 2010 partly explain these results. The 274 broken rails reported in 2011 brought the figures down to a level comparable with 2008-2009.

Relative number of track twists per million train-km




The relative number of track twists has increased slightly in 2011 (0.342) compared with 2010 (0.33). This was caused by an increase of 11 events between 2010 and 2011 which can be partly explained by a better flow of information following the action plan on the control of safety in the maintenance of the infrastructure.

Relative number of signalling failures per million train-km




The relative number of signalling failures has fallen in 2011 (0.63) compared with 2010 (0.652). The reduction found is essentially due to the increase of traffic because the number of events has only changed very slightly from 316 in 2010 to 315 in 2011.

Relative number of signals passed at danger per million train-km



The relative number of signals passed at danger has increased in 2011 (0.152), compared with 2010 (0.132). This increase needs to be put in perspective by considering a constant area, there were 112 signals passed on main lines in 2010 compared with 128 in 2011.

Relative number of wheels and axles fractured per million train-km



This indicator involves a very small number both relatively and absolutely (between 1 and 2 events per year). However it remains potentially serious.

Fractured wheels Fractured axles

4. Monitoring safety recommendations

Four BEA-TT investigation reports which included recommendations were published in 2011. They involved:

- the derailment on 20 December 2009 of an RER train at Choisy-le-Roi;
- the derailment on 29 July 2010 of a coal train at Bully-Grenay (62);
- the collision on 27 September 2010 between a TER and an HGV at Gimont (32);
- the collision on 14 December 2010 between a TER and a coach at Auxerre (89);
-

In addition, BEA-TT has published an interim report on the derailment of wagons carrying dangerous goods on 22 May 2010 at Neufchâteau.

Among these events, the two derailments at Neufchâteau and Bully-Grenay required the EPSF to take preventative measures regarding the types of wagon involved in these events.

In general the EPSF and BEA-TT regularly exchange information on the nature and the causes of events which have taken place as far as their mutual objectives and interests are concerned.

Thus the EPSF decides if any immediate protective measures are required. On its side the BEA-TT carries out a technical enquiry which can result in recommendations. It is then up to the EPSF to monitor their introduction. This last point forms the object of a report to monitor the safety recommendations sent by the EPSF to BEA-TT which gives the facts declared by the RUs and IMs in their annual safety reports as well as certain elements which it was possible to verify when checks were made on areas close to the subject of the recommendations.



Significant changes in the legislation and regulations

The most important new legislation and regulations published in 2011 are the following:

1 March 2011

Commission Regulation (EU) No 201/2011 of 1 March 2011 on the model of declaration of conformity to an authorised type of railway vehicle.

10 May 2011

Commission Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 of 10 May 2011 on a system of certification of entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons. The Member States have to put in place the system of certification of entities in charge of maintenance before 31 May 2012. They can use a scheme of accreditation or recognition.

30 May 2011

Decree No 2011-6098 on the study of dangers in places where dangerous materials are stabled, loaded or unloaded. This decree which applies in railways to marshalling yards and works sites provides for the EPSF to deliver an opinion on the operating methods recommended in the studies of danger.

26 July 2011

Decree No 2011-891 on the traffic management and operating department contains various measures regarding railways

It should be noted that several texts were published in 2011 which were important for the safety and interoperability of railways

10 February 2011

Commission Decision 2011/107/EU of 10 February 2011 amending Decision 2007/756/EC adopting a common specification of the national vehicle register.

29 March 2011

Commission Recommendation of 29 March 2011 on the authorisation for the placing in service of structural subsystems and vehicles under Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. This recommendation specifies the scope of the authorisation for the introduction into commercial service of vehicles supplied by the EPSF and bans the intervention of IMs in regulations for the authorisation process.

4 April 2011

Commission Decision 2011/229/EU of 4 April 2011 concerning the technical specifications of interoperability relating to the subsystem 'rolling stock – noise' of the trans-European conventional rail system.

26 April 2011

Commission Decision 2011/274/EU of 26 April 2011 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the 'energy' subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system.

26 April 2011

Commission Decision 2011/275/EU of 26 April 2011 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the 'infrastructure' subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system.

26 April 2011

Commission Decision 2011/291/EU concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the rolling stock subsystem — 'Locomotives and passenger rolling stock' of the trans-European conventional rail system.

12 May 2011

Commission Decision 2011/314/EU of 12 May 2011 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the 'operation and traffic management' subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system.

22 November 2011

Commission Decision 2011/765/EU of 22 November 2011 on criteria for the recognition of training centres involved in the training of train drivers, on criteria for the recognition of examiners of train drivers and on criteria for the organisation of examinations in accordance with Directive 2007/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.



Authorisations issued during the year regarding railway safety

1. National safety rules

The regulations at State level (laws, decrees, orders) are available on the site www.legifrance.gouv.fr and on the site of the EPSF: www.securite-ferroviaire.fr

The regulations to do with the operating safety, applicable to the RUs using the RFN, are laid down by the Order of 23 June 2003 as amended by the

Orders of 7 December 2006, 12 August 2008, 17 June 2009 and 30 November 2010 on the regulations applicable on the national rail network and the texts published by the IM by virtue of Article 10 of the amended version of Decree No 2006-1279. It is available from the RFF IM in the form of a CD Rom.

2. Issue of safety certificates to RUs

Since 1 May 2007 all the new safety certificates and amendments to previously issued safety certificates have been issued in accordance with Article 68 of Decree No 2006-1279 of 19 October 2006 amended, issued in accordance with the dispositions of Article 10 of Directive 2004/49EC.

The EPSF issues Parts A, valid in the whole of the European Union and Parts B which are necessary for RUs to run on the national rail network.

SNCF, Trenitalia, Trenitalia Veolia Transdev (TVT), TSO, TX Logistik.

In 2011 two undertakings obtained the renewal of their safety certificates: These were Europort France and Colas Rail.

Two applications for the renewal of certificates were granted during the 2011.

Details of these are given in Annex E.

2.1 Activity 2011

Part A safety certificates

Four applications for safety certificates were granted during 2011.

Two safety certificates were renewed during 2011.

Part B safety certificates

Twenty applications for safety certificates (new or amended) were granted during 2011. Two of these applications were made in 2010

The principal reasons for requesting a revision or amendment were the following:

- running on new sections of line of the national rail network;
- acceptance of dangerous goods for carriage;
- modification of the operational organisation.

In 2011, 15 undertakings obtained the issue or the amendment of their safety certificates: Colas Rail, la Compagnie ferroviaire régionale (CFR), Comsa Rail Transport, ETF Services, Eurostar International Limited (EIL), OSR France, la Régie départementale des transports des Bouches du Rhône (RDT13), Renfe, SNCB, SNCB Logistics,

2.2 Methods of assessment

The EPSF operates a procedure to assist RUs to prepare the files that accompanies their applications for safety certificates.

This procedure is divided into several steps:

An initial meeting is organised (possibly with the IM to understand the procedure for gaining access to the network and the related commercial aspects) during which:

- the applicant presents his project;
- the EPSF describes its organisation (if necessary);
- the EPSF makes a presentation of what is expected in the application file for the safety certificate.

Following this initial meeting, some exchanges are formalised between the EPSF and the applicant (by e-mail, telephone or during meetings) throughout the preparation of the file.

While this procedure does not resemble an examination, as the preparation of the file proceeds it does nevertheless enable:

- the EPSF to have a good knowledge of the file and the people concerned which helps the subsequent evaluation;
- the applicant to have almost an assurance that his file will be administratively complete when the application is officially submitted.

This generally enables particular difficulties during the examination of the applications to be avoided. As a result the certificates are usually issued within times which are considerably shorter than the legal time scale.

This procedure is proposed to the applicant who is free to accept it. Nevertheless the quasi-totality of the RUs accepted this procedure.

This procedure was initiated in September 2011 with SNCF whose safety certificate had to be renewed on 28 June 2012. In fact due to the coming into force of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1158/2010 of 9 December 2010 on a common safety method for assessing conformity with the requirements for obtaining railway safety

certificates, a complete revision of the file of application for a safety certificate is necessary. From that time on it was considered essential to begin this procedure as soon as possible.

This also enabled the forthcoming publication of the French regulations at the beginning of 2012 to be anticipated. The arrangements in this will be included in the new version of the EPSF guide which will be published during 2012.

2.3 Charges connected with the issuing of a safety certificate

The Transport Code specifies that there is no charge for the services of the EPSF for examination of an application for a safety certificate.

However the amount of work involved in the examination to authorise a simple safety certificate (or a major amendment) is estimated at two man.months or EUR 20 000 in total. Information given by RUs enables the cost of writing and preparation of their file to be estimated at six man.months, or EUR 50 000 to 60 000. These sums do not include the expenses connected with the organisation of safety in the RU.

3. Issuing safety authorisations

During 2011, the RFF as the IM and the SNCF acting as Delegated Infrastructure Manager (SNCF DIM) carried out a revision of their respective safety management systems.

The principle amendments were concerned with:

- the positioning of the *Direction de la circulation ferroviaire* [Railway Traffic Department (DCF)] and the management of relations with the RFF and the Infrastructure Management Department responsible for the maintenance operations on the RFN of the SNCF DIM.
- the inclusion of the amendments to Decree No 2006-1279 of 19 October 2006 produced by Decree No 2010-814 of 13 July 2010.

- the inclusion of Commission Regulation (EC) 352/2009 of 24 April 2009 on the adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment;
- the inclusion of the successive decisions taken for dealing with undertakings without a safety certificate;
- the presentation of how the RFF operates in undertaking a direct contract.

In view of their extent the amendments made have been considered substantial and their validation has been the subject of a decision of the EPSF.

4. Other authorisations in the current year

4.1 The training centres

In application of the arrangements of the amended order of 30 July 2003, on the conditions of physical and professional aptitude and the training of staff

authorised to carry out safety functions on the national rail network, any member of staff who exercises one of the safety functions listed in the order must have been trained for this function by a training centre approved by the EPSF.

To obtain this approval the training centre must demonstrate, in a file that it prepares for this purpose, its ability to comply with the relative requirements regarding:

- the organisation and in case of renewal of approval, the actual experience of this training centre;
- the human and material resources used;
- the competence of the trainers.

Six requests for approval as a training centre dealt with by the EPSF in 2011 have resulted in a favourable decision. Two new approvals have been issued for a probationary period of two years. Three extensions of approval for new safety functions and one renewal of approval have been granted.

4.2 The certification of the entities in charge of maintenance

As for the RUs, Commission Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 of the of 10 May 2011 on a system of certification of entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons and amending Regulation (EC) No 653/2007 offers the possibility of certifying as an entity in charge of maintenance (ECM) an IM who out the maintenance of the wagons belonging to his organisation. Its ability to carry out corresponding tasks is then evaluated as part of its application for a safety approval.

No IM applied to take advantage of this possibility during 2011.

Commission Regulation (EU) No 445/2011 of the of 10 May 2011 on a system of certification of entities in charge of maintenance for freight wagons and amending Regulation (EC) No 653/2007 was published in the Journal of the European Union of 11 May 2011.

This regulation replaces the arrangements presented in the agreement protocol and its annexes establishing the fundamental principles of a common system of certification of the ECMs of wagons signed on 14 May 2009 at Brussels between the representatives of Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland and Romania and subsequently signed by Switzerland. These arrangements were given in Article 3.1 and Annex II of the Order of 1 July 2004 as amended regarding the requirements applicable to rolling stock running on the national rail network.

Beyond the principles that it specifies for the certification of ECMs, for the entities which only carry out this work, it also enables a RU which itself carries out maintenance on its own wagons to be certified as an ECM. Its ability to carry out corresponding tasks is then assessed in the context of its application for a safety approval.



Supervision of the operators

1. The actions carried out

1.1 Safety checks and monitoring

1.1.1. Checks

In 2011, 94 checks consisting of 50 audits and 44 inspections were carried out by the EPSF on the RFN, or an increase of 20% compared with 2010. Of the 50 audits carried out, 23 were audits of the 'systematic type' based on the group of subjects defined in advance and 27 were the audits called 'ad hoc'. As far as the systematic audits were concerned, in 2011 they concentrated on safety management systems (SMSs), inspection and feedback of experience as well as the training centres and the authorisations to start commercial service

Number of audits of RUs/IM carried out in 2011				
	IM / DIM	RU	Training centres	Others
Number of systematic audits	4	13	6	0
Total number of audits carried out	9	23	6	12

Number of inspections of RUs/IM carried out in 2011				
	IM / DIM	RU	Training centres	Others
Number of inspections carried out	4	13	6	0

Concerning the short term audits, two of them were of particular interest: the audit carried out on the taking into account of safety during the allocation of paths and that on the components of interoperability.

- The audit of the paths was in connection with the RUs, the Railway Board and the RFF. This audit enabled all the safety procedures connected with the principles of allocation of paths to be examined from the request up to the trace on the train running graph in all its phases of construction.
- As for the audit of the components of interoperability, it dealt in detail with the ability to run trains without restriction on the national railways of the different Member States and setting up any action which might prove to be necessary in the field of the harmonisation of the technical standards and the regulations.

1.1.2. Monitoring

In 2011 the 'Incidents Database' group recorded more than 10 000 operations-related events

regarding the operating, more than 2000 of which were directly concerned with safety. All the information that reaches this group comes from the sources of information of the IM and RUs.

The EPSF launched five consecutive safety alerts, either due to the recurrent character of an incident, or the necessity of quickly informing all the RUs, holders of wagons and other national safety authorities because of the seriousness of events necessitating the introduction of recommendations or the taking of protective measures. This was the case, for example, after the fracture of the central axle of a car carrying wagon that occurred on 13 December 2011.

The EPSF has continued to organise the feedback from the 'System' in 2011. Four meetings have been held of representatives of all the RUs authorised to run on the RFN, the IM as well as the representatives of MEEDDTL and BEA-TT.

The discussions at these feed-back meetings have, in particular, covered:

- the sharing of good practices that have been identified;
- the sharing of the feedback following the presentation of an incident or accident;
- debates on common problems.

In addition to the triggering of alerts and the feedback meetings the monitoring was made up of:

- four quarterly safety meetings between the IM, the DIM and the DST;
- The distribution of 12 monthly letters giving information on the most significant 'safety' incidents.

1.2 Things to look out for / points needing follow-up

It is necessary for the RUs and the IM to give increased attention to certain points found to be weak during inspections:

- the organisation and carrying out of their own checks, inspections and audits;
- the organisation and the implementation of the feedback of experience;
- for the training centres, the responsibility for the teaching at the centre in relation to the trainers

of the RUs as well as the experience, the training for teaching and the maintenance of

knowledge of the trainers.

2. Measures taken as a result of inspections

The total of 94 checks resulted in the notification to the inspected entities of 285 deviations, 4 of which were blocking points, 72 were major deviations and 209 reserve points.

These figures were stable overall compared with 2010 in which the EPSF recorded 251 deviations but on a smaller number of inspections. A reduction in the number of blocking points was particularly noticeable (13 in 2010) due, in part, to the

improvement in the operation of the training centres which in the past formed the majority of the entities for which blocking points had been notified.

A blocking point or a major deviation means that the entity concerned has to apply a corrective action, within a specified timescale. No withdrawal or suspension of safety certificates or authorisations was announced by the EPSF in 2011.



Introduction of the common safety method for the evaluation and assessment of risks

Regulation 352/2009/EC adopted a common safety method on risk evaluation and assessment.

It came into force on 19 July 2010 for significant technical modifications on rolling stock and structural sub-systems and has then been extended from 1 July 2012 to all significant modifications to do with technical, organisational or operational aspects.

This transition should enable all the people concerned to progressively familiarise themselves with this new approach and the application of the method.

In order to take account of this new regulatory requirement, the EPSF has arranged for the guides for applicants for safety authorisations and certificates for RUs and the IM to be rewritten, as well as for the authorisations for putting them into service.

It also plans to publish two recommendations regarding respectively:

- 'the taking into account of railway safety in view of the introduction into service on the RFN of commercial services or operations: organisation of the authorisations to be obtained and actions to be carried out'
- 'the application of the common safety methods on the RFN'

These texts will be published before the end of 2012.

Moreover as part of this initiative to harmonise safety practices on the railway system, the EPSF organised six sessions to explain and raise awareness of it during the first half of 2012 aimed at:

- IMs, their deputies, their contractors and sub-contractors;
- RUs that have obtained a safety certificate authorising them to run in France.
- approved qualified organisations and rolling stock builders.

Following these meetings, the participants agreed that the common safety method did not apply only in a limited way but should be part of daily practice. It should be remembered that the questions regarding the associated risks, their coverage and the nature of the amendment must be asked each time a change is envisaged. If this proves to be significant, it is necessary to go to an independent assessor. In all cases the traceability and the feedback of experience of the application of the common safety method on the evaluation of risks must be carried out by the entity which introduces a change to the system.



Conclusion

As far as railway safety is concerned, 2011 was marked by a significant increase in the number of deaths and serious injuries on the French railway system which brought the figures up to the level seen in 2008. This increase was essentially due to an increase in the number of victims who were not part of the transport system. Fifty non-authorised people who entered railway premises in 2011 have unfortunately been fatally injured, the majority of them were hit by a train or were in an irregular situation on the track.

The EPSF collects this data as part of its statistical missions but does not have the resources to explain these changes of behaviour. They would merit a more detailed analysis by the IM and the local police authorities.

On the other hand regarding the monitoring of the safety of trains, the trend observed in 2011 is positive with a reduction of 6% compared with 2010.

This generally positive change nevertheless covers very different situations. The EPSF would like to mention three events which are particularly representative of the risk situation in 2011.

Three significant events

The derailment on straight track of two wagons of a freight train travelling at about 95 km/h that occurred just before Artenay Station (45) on 9 March

This accident did not cause any injuries to people but the material damage was serious and it was the subject of an investigation by the BEA-TT. The cause of this accident was the fracture of the axle of a wheelset due to a fatigue crack in this axle. This exceptional event on the railway network shows the importance of keeping the rolling stock used in good condition.

The derailment of ballast wagons between Golfech and Valence on 20 October

This derailment took place on the main line, although the train was running at about 90 km/h. Three wagons loaded with ballast derailed, two of which fouled the adjacent line. This situation could have had very severe consequences because of a passing TGV. Some damage was caused to the TGV trainset (windows broken and traces of impact and rubbing on the side of the body). The cause of this derailment, on which BEA-TT carried out an investigation, has not been clearly identified, the initial investigations did not show up any abnormalities or deviations from the safety rules. Such an event shows the existence of permanent risks in the operation of safety and the necessity of

watching rigorously over the maintenance of the different technical or organisational 'safety barriers'.

The collision of one freight train into another followed by the derailment of its last wagon, a tank wagon used to carry dangerous materials, which was empty at the time, between Salon and Miramas (13) on 25 October

There were no injuries but the 'Dangerous Goods Plan' was triggered. The collision occurred at about 20 km/h and was due to a lack of attention by the driver of the train formed of two locomotives running in an occupied block under the 'proceed on sight system'. This situation brings home again the importance of complying with the fundamentals of safety in the basic activities of everyday life, whether this is the application of the procedures imposed by the signalling or by the operating instructions. This situation must be dealt with in terms of feedback of experience in the field of safety management of the teams of drivers. The management of safety by the introduction of checks on the spot or after the event and the feedback of experience remain indispensable tools for the operators to improve the level of safety.

The changes noted in 2011 are shown in a summarised manner for each of the main areas.

Operating

2011 has seen a reduction in the number of collisions and derailments. However, the impacts of civil engineering equipment with commercial trains are a subject of concern. These incidents which are no doubt connected with the increase in the number of works sites on the network systematically show

up the difficulties of organisation and communication. The continuation of the efforts to renew the system makes this subject a theme to monitor carefully.

The number of signals passed at danger has stabilised during the last three years. On main lines, the number of signals passed at danger with fouling of the point protected has halved between 2007 and 2011.

Also the number of incidents involving dangerous goods has fallen sharply in 2011, in spite of an upsurge of events that occurred at the start of the year on the site of Woippy. These incidents were mainly to do with defects in loading.

Rolling stock

Fires on rolling stock, the principal cause of which was a defect on a tractive unit, reached 48 incidents in 2010 but has fallen to 30 in 2011.

On the other hand, an important number of incidents connected with losses of parts from moving trains has been reported. Three similar incidents involving tank wagons (sun protection plate situated on the top of the wagon becoming loose) have, for example, been recorded in 2011. The good condition of the rolling stock thus forms a point to be monitored by the EPSF. The EPSF will increase its efforts in 2012 on the inspections of entities responsible for maintenance that have responsibility for the programming and carrying out of the maintenance.

Infrastructure

The number of broken rails has fallen throughout the year compared with the previous year, due in

particular to a winter period that was less severe in the fourth quarter.

Nevertheless, incidents affecting the track must be kept under observation, especially the maintenance policy and feedback of experience to improve the control of the track geometry. This is necessary, in particular, in preparation for the hot season, in order not to reproduce events of the type like that at Roquemaure on the high speed line or in the station of Solliès-Pont during the month of July. One indicator is particularly monitored and concerns the abnormal impacts reported by drivers due to a defect in the infrastructure.

Acts of vandalism reported on the network are also a risk factor for the safety of trains. Certain thefts of cable upset the operation of fixed installations and have endangered safety.

Monitoring the operators

The EPSF has carried out audits on the subject of the internal control and feedback of experience required by the safety management systems of RUs and has checked the concrete list of them. Generally, these areas still have room for improvement and their introduction is carried out with varying degrees of efficiency.

The effective deployment of these processes, as the best ways of monitoring the corrective actions identified at the end of the checks carried out, will form the lines of improvement of the practices to check safety that the EPSF plans to develop in 2012.





Annexes


Annex A

Organisational chart of the EPSF

1. Internal organisation



2. Relations between the EPSF and its principal partners



Annex B.

Information relative to the network and the railway sector

1. IMs

1.1 Réseau ferré de France

Name Postal address	Web address Link to the system reference document	Safety authorisation (number/date)	Date of start of commercial activity
RFF 92, avenue de France 75648 Paris Cedex 13	www.rff.fr rff-document-de-reference.eu	27/02/2008	July 1997

km of electrified line by type	15 687 km of which 5 863 km are electrified at 1 500 V, 9 698 km at 25 kV and 126 km with a 3rd rail;
km of double and single track	42 039 km of line of which 29 296 km are double track and 12 743 km single track
km of high speed lines	2022 km
% km of lines using an ATP [Automatic Train protection] system	52.3%
Number of level crossings	18 138 of which 15 756 are on lines operated by the RFF

1.2 TP Ferro

Name, postal address	Web address Link to the system reference document	Safety authorisation (number/date)	Date of start of commercial activity
TP FERRO Ctra de Llers a Hostalets GIP- 5107, Km 1 17 730 Llers - Espagne	www.tpferro.com http://www.tpferro.com/sites/default/files/images/Document-de-Reference-du-Reseau-TPFERRO-2012.pdf	15/12/2010	December 2010

km of electrified line by type	4.4495 km at 1500 V and 89.5 km at 25 kV
km of double and single track	94.13 km of double track
km of high speed lines	86.73 km
% km of lines using an ATP system	100 %
Number of level crossings	0

2. RUs

Name	Postal address	Safety certificate A-B 2004/49/EC number	Date of start of commercial activity	Type of traffic
CFL CARGO	11, boulevard Kennedy L-4170 Esch sur Alzette - Luxembourg	A: LU 11 2010 0001 B: FR 12 2009 0016	04/02/2008	Freight
COLAS RAIL	44 rue Mermoz 78 600 Maisons Laiffite	A: FR 11 2009 0007 B: FR 12 2009 0015	08/01/07 under certificate SECO RAIL	Freight
SNCB	40 avenue de la porte de Hal (section 13/4) B1060 Bruxelles - Belgium	A: BE 11 2008 0001 B: FR 12 2008 0012	11/12/2006	Freight
ECR	Immeuble le Palacio 25-29 place de la Madeleine 75008 Paris	A: FR 11 2010 0016 B: FR 12 2010 0017	13/05/2006 under certificate EWSI	Freight
SNCF	34 rue du Cdt Mouchotte 75699 Paris	A: FR 11 2009 0021 B: FR 12 2009 0022	Before the issue	Freight and passengers
VFLI	6 rue d'Amsterdam, 75009 Paris	A: FR 11 2010 0013 B: FR 12 2010 0025	04/10/2007	Freight
TSO	Chemin du Corps de Garde, 77501 Challes	A: FR 11 2009 0002 B: FR 12 2009 0012	29/07/2009	Freight
TRENITALIA	Piazza della Croce Rossa 1 006161 Rome - Italie	B: FR 12 2010 0002	22 02/2011	Freight and passengers
TPCF	26 boulevard de l'Agly 66220 Saint-Paul de Fenouillet	A: FR 11 2010 0005 B: FR 12 2010 0006	22/07/2010	Freight
CFR	33 rue Louis Coudant 58340 Cergy-la-Tour	A: FR 11 2010 0009 B: FR 12 2010 0012	19/11/2010	Freight
EUROSTAR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED	Times House, Bravingtons Walk London N1 9AW - United Kingdom	A: UK 11 2009 0083 B: FR 12 2010 0011	01/09/2010	Passengers
EUROPORTE CHANNEL	15 rue des Sablons - 75016 Paris	A: FR 11 2010 0020 B: FR 12 2010 0021	26/1 1/2007 under certificate Europorte 2	Freight
EUROPORTE FRANCE	15 rue des Sablons - 75016 Paris	A: FR 11 2010 0018 B: FR 12 2010 0019	13/06/2005 under certificate CFTA CARGO	Freight
OSR France	Domaine Paindavoine 13 rue Berthelot - 59000 Lille	A: FR 11 2010 0022 B: FR 12 2010 0023	13/12/2010	Freight
CROSSRAIL BENELUX	Luchthavenlei 7A B 2100 Deurne - Belgium	A: BE 11 2008 0003 B: FR 12 2010 0024	Launch planned during 2011	Freight
RENFE	Avda. De Burgos, 8bis Planta 10 Edificio Genesis 28036 Madrid - Spain	A: ES 11 2011 0002 B: FR 12 2011 0011	21/12/2010	Freight
SNCB LOGISTICS	40 Avenue de la Porte de Hal Section 13/4 B1060 Bruxelles - Belgium	A: BE 11 2010 0003 B: FR 12 2011 0003		
ETF SERVICES	267 chaussée Jules César 95250 Beauchamp	A: FR 11 2011 0006 B: FR 12 2011 0007		
COMSA RAIL TRANSPORT	Edificio Numancia 1, 10 ^a C/ Viriato, 47, 08014 Barcelona - Spain	A: ES 11 2007 0001 B: FR 12 2011 0005		
TRENITALIA VEOLIA TRANSDEV	15 rue des Sablons - 75016 Paris	A: FR 11 2011 0020 B: FR 12 201 1 0021		
TX LOGISTIK	Rhoendorferstr. 85 D 53604 Bad Honnef -Germany	A: DE 11 2011 0000 B: FR 12 2011 0017		Freight
RDT13	Siège Social de la RDT13 1 rue Ernest Prados - Pont de l'Arc 13090 Aix en Provence, France	A: FR 11 2011 0022 B: FR 12 2011 0023		

Annex C

Common safety indicators


1. Common safety indicators - data

Where data is available, the values given below for one year correspond to the average of the indicator for the last five years, the long term objective is to

calculate the average for the last five years. For example, in the case of an indicator available in 2007, the data for 2011 are calculated with the values relative to the average of the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.


1.1 Overview of performance

N10: Relative number of accidents per million train-km




Significant accidents


TK10: Relative number of deaths per million train-km




TS10: Relative number of serious injuries per million train-km



I10: Relative number of precursors per million train-km





Total costs in million Euro per million train-km




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
1.2 Accidents broken down by type

 Relative number of accidents
 Relative number of significant accidents


N11: Relative number of collisions per million train-km




N12: Relative number of derailments per million train-km




N13: Relative number of accidents on level crossings per million train-km




N14: Relative number of accidents to persons caused by moving rolling stock per million train-km



N15: Relative number of fires on rolling stock per million train-km




N16: Relative number of other accidents per million train-km




1.3 Deaths broken down by type of person involved


PK10: Relative number of passenger deaths per million train-km




LK10: Relative number of level crossing users killed per million train-km




PK20: Relative number of passenger deaths per million passenger-km




UK10: Relative number of non-authorised persons killed per million train-km



SK10: Relative number of employees killed per million train-km




OK10: Relative number of other persons killed per million train-km




1.4 Injuries broken down by type of person involved


PS10: Relative number of passengers injured per million train-km




LS10: Relative number of level crossing users injured per million train-km




PS20: Relative number of passengers injured per million passenger-km




US10: Relative number of non-authorised persons injured per million train-km



SS10: Relative number of employees injured per million train-km




OS10: Relative number of other persons injured per million train-km




1.5 Accident precursors


I11: Relative number of broken rails per million train-km




I12: Relative number of track twists per million train-km




I13: Relative number of signalling failures per million train-km




I14: Relative number of signals passed at danger per million train-km



I15: Relative number of wheels fractured on rolling stock in service per million train-km




I16: Relative number of axles fractured on rolling stock in service per million train-km




1.6 Technical safety of the infrastructure and its implementation, safety management


Percentage of lines fitted with an automatic train protection system (ATP) in service



Number of kilometres of line




Percentage of train-km using operational ATP systems




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Percentage of the number of internal audits carried out compared with the number of audits required (and/or planned)




The definition used for this indicator is different for each RU
A study must be carried out to improve the quality of the information and obtain a comparable value from 2012

Total number of level crossings



Total number of level crossings
Total number of level crossings on lines operated

Total number of level crossings per km of line



2. Definitions used in the report

2.1 Definitions linked to types of accident:

Significant accidents

Any accident involving at least one railway moving vehicle and causing the death or serious injuries to at least one person or significant damage to rolling stock, to tracks, to other installations or to the environment (any damage equivalent to or greater than EUR 150 000), or serious disturbances to train running (suspension of railway services on a main line for six hours or more). Accidents that occur in workshops, storerooms and depots are excluded.

Collision

Accident occurring on the national rail network, resulting principally in an impact within the clearance gauge between one part of the train and:

- a part of another train (front to front, catching up front to end or side collision);
- fixed infrastructure parts (buffers, etc.);
- rolling stock being shunted;
- any object (excluding animals) temporarily present on or near the track (except items lost at level crossings from vehicles or users of the level crossing).

A collision occurring following a derailment is counted as a collision.

Derailment

Accident occurring on the national rail network, with the main consequence that at least one wheel of a train has left the rail.

Level crossing accident

Significant accident occurring on the national rail network, the main consequence of which is a collision, at a level crossing, of at least one railway vehicle and:

- one or more crossing vehicles;
- other level crossing users such as pedestrians or other objects temporary present on or near the track (if lost by a crossing vehicle or user).

Accidents to persons caused by moving rolling stock

Accident, not on a level crossing, involving one or more persons who are hit either by a railway vehicle or by an object attached to, or that has become

detached from, the vehicle. Persons who fall from railway vehicles are counted in this indicator.

Fire in rolling stock

Accident occurring on the national rail network requiring intervention by the fire service, the main consequence of which is a fire and/or explosion occurring in a railway vehicle (including its load) when running between the departure station and the destination, including when stopped at the departure station, the destination or intermediate stops, as well as during shunting operations.

Other accidents

Accident occurring on the national rail network, which is not classed as a train collision, train derailment, level crossing accident, accident to persons struck by rolling stock in motion or fire in rolling stock.

2.2 Definitions linked to the human consequences of accidents

Persons killed

Any person killed outright or dying within 30 days as a result of a railway accident, except suicide.

Serious personal injury

Any person who has been hospitalised for more than 24 hours following a railway accident except for attempted suicide.

Passenger

A person who is not part of the train crew who travels by train, including people trying to board or alight from a train in motion.

Staff of any company including sub-contractors

People whose employment is in connection with the railway and are at work at the time of the accident. This includes train crews and people handling rolling stock and infrastructure installations (including managers and staff of sub-contractors).

Users of level crossings

A person using a level crossing by any means of transport or on foot.

Non-authorised person

A person present on railway premises where such presence is forbidden, with the exception of level crossing users.

Other

Persons who are not passengers, staff of any RU including subcontractors, level-crossing users or people not authorised to be on railway premises.

2.3 Definitions linked to precursors

All precursors are notified, whether or not they lead to an accident. The precursors which lead to an accident are notified in the CSI relative to precursors. If they are significant, the accidents that occurred are also notified in the CSI relative to accidents.

Broken rail

Any rail which is separated into two or more pieces or which exhibits a gap in the running surface more than 60 mm in length where the two following criteria are met:

- the gap is more than 10 mm in depth;
- the residual width of the rail head, measured on the running surface, is less than 30 mm.

Track buckle

Faults related to the continuity and the geometry of the track, requiring line closure or immediate reduction of the maximum permitted speed to maintain safety.

Signalling fault

Any failure of a signalling system (either to infrastructure or to rolling stock) resulting in the presentation of signalling information which is less restrictive than that required.

Signals passed at danger

An event where a train passes a signal at danger without authorisation. Cases in which, for any reason, the signal is not turned to danger in time to allow the driver to stop the train before the signal are not included.

Broken wheel

Fracture affecting the essential parts of the wheel. In 2008, broken wheels were counted only where they could cause a derailment or a collision.

Broken axle

Fracture affecting the essential parts of the axle. In 2008, broken wheels were counted only where they could cause a derailment or a collision.

Annex D

Significant amendments to the legislation and the regulations

These amendments are given in Chapter D.

Annex E

The development of safety certification and authorisation

1. Safety certificates issued in accordance with Directive 2001/14/EC

Not relevant in 2011

2. Safety certificates issued in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed	RU
E.2.1 Number of valid Part A safety certificates, registered during 2011	With licence issued in France	3	1	2	Colas Rail ETF Services Europorte France RDT 13 TPCF Trenitalia Veolia Transdev
	With licence issued by another member State	-	-	-	-

		New	Updated / amended	Renewed	RU
E.2.2 Number of valid Part B safety certificates, registered during 2011	With part A issued in France	3	8	2	CFR Colas Rail (2) ETF Services Europorte France OSR France RDT 13 SNCF (2) TPCF (2) Trenitalia Veolia Transdev TSO
	With Part A issued by another member State	3	3	1	Comsa Rail Transport Eurostar Renfe SNCB SNCB Logistics Trenitalia TX Logistik

			A	R	I	RU
E.2.3 Number of applications for Part A safety certificates, registered during 2011	With licence issued in France	New certificates	3	-	-	ETF Services Trenitalia Veolia Transdev RDT 13
		Certificates revised / amended	1	-	2	TPCF (2) ECR
		Certificates renewed	2	-	-	Europorte France Colas Rail
	With licence issued by another member State	New certificates	-	-	-	-
		Certificates revised / amended	-	-	-	-
		Certificates renewed	-	-	-	-

			A	R	i	RU
E.2.4 Number of applications for Part B safety certificates, registered during 2011		New certificates	3	-	-	ETF Services Trenitalia Veolia Transdev RDT 13
	With part A issued in France	Certificates revised / amended	7	-	2	OSR France, CFR TPCF (3) TSO SNCF (2) ECR
		Certificates renewed	2	-	-	Europorte France Colas Rail
		New certificates	1	-	-	Comsa Rail Transport
	With Part A issued by another member State	Certificates revised / amended	3	-	-	SNCB Eurostar Trenitalia
		Certificates renewed	1	-	-	Renfe

A = application accepted, the certificate has already been issued R = application rejected, no certificate has been issued I = The matter was still under consideration at 31 December 2011

3. Safety authorisations issued in accordance with Directive 2004/49/EC

	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
E.3.1 Number of valid safety approvals held during 2011 by IMs registered in France	-	1	-

		A	R	I	IM
E.3.2 Number of applications for safety approvals made during 2011 by IMs registered in France	New approvals	-	-	-	-
	Updated / amended approvals	1	-	-	RFF / SNCF DIM
	Renewed approvals	-	-	-	-

A = application accepted, approval already issued R = application refused, no approval issued I = The matter was still under consideration at 31 December 2011

	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
E.3.3 Number of valid safety approvals held during 2011 by IMs registered in another member State	-	-	-

		A	R	I	IM
E.3.4 Number of safety approval applications submitted during 2011 by IMs recorded in another member State	New approvals	-	-	-	-
	Updated / amended approvals	-	-	-	-
	Renewed approvals	-	-	-	-

A = application accepted, approval already issued R = application refused, no approval issued I = The matter was still under consideration at 31 December 2011

4. Procedural aspects - Safety certificates Part A

		RU	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
		Colas Rail			120
Time, after receipt of all the information necessary between the receipt of an application for a Part A safety certificate during 2011 for RUs who hold		ETF Services	90		
	a licence issued by France	Europorte France			117
		RDT 13	120		
		TPCF		120	
		Trenitalia Veolia Transdev	8*		
	a licence issued by another Member State	-	-	-	-

* Only the RU licence was lacking

5. Procedural aspects - Safety certificates Part B

		RU	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
Time, after receipt of all the necessary information between the receipt of an application and the issue of a Part B safety certificate during 2011 for RUs which hold	a Part A issued in France	CFR		76	
		Colas Rail		115	
		Colas Rail			120
		ETF Services	90		
		Europorte France			117
		OSR France		35	
		RDT 13	120		
		SNCF		57	
		SNCF		6	
		TPCF		120	
		TPCF		17	
		Trenitalia Veolia Transdev	8*		
		TSO		75	
	A Part A issued by another Member State	Comsa Rail Transport	115		
		Eurostar		120	
		Renfe		21	
		SNCB		1**	
		SNCB Logistics	119		
		Trenitalia		11	
		TX Logistik	118		

* Only the licence of the RU was missing ** Revision of the Part B form

6. Procedural aspects - Safety authorisations

		IM	New	Updated / amended	Renewed
Period of time, after receipt of all necessary information, between receipt of an application and final issue of a safety authorisation during 2011 for an IM	RFF / SNCF-DIM	-	105	-	-
	recorded by another member State	-	-	-	-



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The EPSF exercises for the account of the Minister responsible for Transport and as laid down in the regulations, the functions devolved to the national railway safety authority in the sense of the Directive 2004/49/EC