



MINISTRY FOR
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BUREAU

FINAL REPORT (EXTRACTION)



2021-0507-5
(HU-10056)

Railway accident / Accident at a level crossing
Sátoraljaújhely (SR 2), 31 March 2021

Translation

This document is the translation of Points 1, 5 and 6 of Hungarian version of the Final Report. Although efforts have been made to translate the mentioned parts of the Final Report as accurately as possible, discrepancies may occur. In this case, the Hungarian Final Report is the authentic, official version.

Basic principles of the safety investigation

The purpose of the safety investigation fulfilled by Transportation Safety Bureau (TSB) as National Investigation Body of Hungary is to reveal the causes and circumstances of serious railway accidents, railway accidents and railway incidents and propose recommendations in order to prevent similar incidents. The safety investigation is not intended to examine and determine fault, blame or liability in any form.

The findings of the safety investigation are based on an assessment of the evidence available and obtained by TSB in the course of the investigation, taking into account the principles of a fair and impartial procedure. In the Final Report, the persons involved in the occurrence shall be referred to by the positions and duties they had at the time of the occurrence.

The Final Report shall not have binding force and no appeal proceedings may be initiated against it.

This safety investigation has been carried out by TSB pursuant to relevant provisions of

- Act CLXXXIV of 2005 on the safety investigation of aviation, railway and marine accidents and incidents;
- Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/572 of 24 April 2020 on the reporting structure to be followed for railway accident and incident investigation reports;
- in the absence of other related regulation of the Act CLXXXIV of 2005, the TSB conducts the investigation in accordance with Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration Procedures.

Act CLXXXIV of 2005 is to serve compliance with Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety.

The competence of the TSB is based on Government Regulation № 230/2016. (VII.29.) on the assignment of a transportation safety body and on the dissolution of Transportation Safety Bureau with legal succession.

The safety investigation is independent of other investigations, administrative infringement or criminal proceedings, as well as proceedings initiated by employers in connection with the accident or incident.

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1. SUMMARY

On 31 May 2021, at 20:10, at the level crossing with Main Road 37 near Sátoraljaújhely station, the train № 5228 collided with a road vehicle which consisted of a road tractor and a loaded semi-trailer. As a consequence of the collision, the semi-trailer separated from the tractor and the driving coach (in lead position) of the train derailed.

The locomotive driver was injured seriously, the truck driver had minor injuries, and there was significant financial damage.

The occurrence was attributed to human factors on the part of the truck driver; the warning lights protecting the level crossing worked correctly, showing red alternately blinking red lights in the direction of the main road, and the visibility of the lights was good.

TSB found no grounds to issue a safety recommendation.

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary

5.1.1 Direct causes

Acts, mistakes, events or conditions or a combination thereof the elimination or avoiding of which could probably have prevented the accident or incident:

- a) the truck driver entered the level crossing despite the blinking red lights of the warning lights.

5.1.2 Indirect causes

Acts, mistakes, events or conditions which influenced the occurrence by increasing its probability, accelerating the effects or the severity of the consequences, but the elimination of which would not have prevented the occurrence: the IC identified o such factor.

5.1.3 Systemic factors

Causal or contributing factors of organisational, management, social or regulatory nature which are likely to have an effect on similar or related occurrences, particularly including regulatory framework conditions, the design and use of the safety management systems, the skills of the personnel, the procedures and maintenance: the IC identified o such factor.

5.2 Actions taken

No measure to prevent accidents was taken by the railway undertakings.

5.3 Additional notes

- a) The locomotive driver had exceeded the speed limits on longer track sections between Sárospatak and Sátoraljaújhely station.

5.4 Proven procedures, good practices

The IC identified no circumstances which would have served to mitigate the consequences of the case or to prevent more serious outcomes.

5.5 Lessons learnt

The occurrence offers no lessons to learn other than the necessity to pay due attention when driving a vehicle.

6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

Similar occurrences can be avoided by observing the relevant rules and paying due attention by vehicle drivers therefore the IC finds no grounds to issue a safety recommendation.