

Extract from the investigation report RJ 2011:02 on an incident occurred on 13/03/2010

Summary

On Friday, 13 March 2010, a near-collision occurred between train 9765 and train 92 on Skutskär södra (south).

Train 9765 was to transport timber to Furuviik södra (south). The train consisted of two locomotives and 22 wagons and had been assembled at Gävle freight yard. Earlier, the wagons had come from Borlänge to Gävle and in Gävle two diesel locomotives were coupled to the wagons instead of the locomotive that had been used from Borlänge.

Train 9765 had travelled from Gävle towards Furuviik södra and the driver performed a deceleration test of the train at Bomansberget. The driver then noticed that the train braked very poorly and that the speed increased on the downward slope instead of decreasing.

Only after about 10 km did the driver successfully stop the train which had by then passed a signal at "stop" and driven up a switch.

The direct cause of the incident was that the main brake pipe was blocked between the two locomotives.

Underlying causes included the fact that it was not clear what requirements were applicable to brake testing when coupling locomotives and that there was not enough time in the driver's schedule for setting up the locomotives.

Recommendations

SHK notes that a recommendation submitted in investigations RJ 2007:02 and RJ 2009:09 is also applicable in this investigation and submits the same recommendation as in these earlier investigations.

The Swedish Transport Agency is recommended to:

- ensure that the risk of single faults in connection with the establishment of a train's braking capacity is minimised, for example by the introduction of checklists, etc. (see sections 3.3 B1 and B2) (RJ 2007:02 R1);
- consider whether the rules for brake tests can be adapted to achieve greater clarity so that the braking tests ensure that the driver can brake the train (see sections 2.3.1 and 3.2.2 H5 and H7) (RJ 2011:02 R1);
- in its supervisory activities also check that the railway undertakings have systems which ensure that staff have sufficient working hours to perform duties as prescribed (see section 2.2.1) (RJ 2011:02 R2);
- conduct and document risk assessments when proposing changes in rules that may affect traffic safety (see sections 2.3.4 and 3.2.2 H7) (RJ 2011:02 R3);
- investigate whether protection requirements for train sets are sufficient to achieve the necessary level of safety in the railway system (see sections 2.3.3 and 3.3 B6) (RJ 2011:02 R4).